Alright, let's talk about Army Secretary Dan Driscoll's big move. He's promising a revolution in how the Army buys things, ditching the usual defense giants for smaller, nimbler players. The stated goal? Faster delivery of weapons and tech to the troops. Sounds good, but let's dig into the numbers, shall we?
The "90/10 Flip" and Its Implications
Driscoll is talking about a "90/10 flip"—moving from 90% purpose-built military solutions to 90% commercially available tech. He claims the defense industry "conned" the Pentagon into thinking it needed bespoke solutions. Now, I've seen this kind of rhetoric before. Promises of efficiency, cutting waste, blah blah blah. The question is, does the data support this bold claim?
Here's where it gets interesting. Driscoll himself admits the Army hasn't exactly been a dream client. He acknowledges their "insane processes" and the difficulty of building against their demand signal. (A classic bureaucratic quagmire, if I ever saw one.) So, is this really about the primes being inefficient, or is it about the Army finally admitting it's part of the problem?
And this is the part of the report that I find genuinely puzzling. If the Army’s acquisition process is so convoluted, how will simply shifting to commercial vendors solve the problem? Won't those vendors still have to navigate the same bureaucratic maze?
The reorganization involves consolidating 12 Program Executive Offices (PEOs) into six Portfolio Acquisition Executives (PAEs). The stated goal is to cut bureaucracy by 30-50%. That’s a big claim. But reorganizations are like rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic, unless you address the fundamental issues. (And those issues, I suspect, are deeply rooted in the Pentagon's culture.) Army Overhauls Acquisition Structure
The Innovation Pathway: A Fast Lane or a Dead End?
Then there's the Pathway for Innovation and Technology (PIT), designed to quickly develop new technologies. It will oversee parts of RCCTO, the Army Applications Laboratory, and the Joint Innovation Outpost. Sounds like a good idea on paper – a dedicated channel for getting cutting-edge tech into the hands of soldiers. But I've seen these "innovation hubs" before. They often become isolated from the rest of the organization, losing their impact.
Driscoll is also talking about buying the "85 percent solution" and iterating over time. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth echoed this sentiment, wanting to "increase acquisition risk in order to decrease operational risk.” This is a smart move. Military-spec perfection is the enemy of "good enough" and "available now."
But here's the rub: can the Army actually accept "good enough"? Can they resist the urge to endlessly tweak and modify until the "85 percent solution" becomes a bloated, over-engineered mess? The historical data isn't exactly encouraging.
We are also seeing the Army already incorporating commercial products into its systems, specifically General Motor’s engines for the service’s infantry squad vehicles (ISVs), adding that it is looking at Caterpillar engines for the M1E3, the Army’s next-generation Abrams tank.
The China Factor and Drone Warfare
Driscoll also points to Ukraine as a "Silicon Valley of warfare," highlighting the effectiveness of drones. He mentions that Ukraine is manufacturing four million drones a year, while China is at 12 to 14 million. The Army wants to buy a million drones over the next two to three years.
Here's the math: even if the Army hits its target of a million drones, that's still a fraction of what China is producing. And quantity isn't everything. The quality, the integration with existing systems, and the training of personnel are just as important.
And here’s another interesting insight: Under Secretary of War Hegseth, the United States Army has been put in charge of the counterdrone threat for the Pentagon. What’s occurring in Ukraine, what’s happening in Russia, if you look at the speed and scale of the devastation that can come from drones, we as a federal government have got to lead on it.
Just Another Five-Sided Building Shuffle?
Driscoll's plan has potential, but the devil is in the details. Reorganizing the org chart is easy. Changing the culture of a massive bureaucracy is much harder. The Army needs to prove it can actually embrace commercial solutions, streamline its processes, and move at the speed of modern warfare.
I've looked at hundreds of these filings, and this particular initiative is unusual. It's not just about saving money (though that's certainly part of it). It's about fundamentally rethinking how the Army does business. But until I see concrete results – faster deployment times, lower costs, and a clear advantage over our adversaries – I'll remain cautiously skeptical.
